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Goshkin: Workmen's Compensation

Workmen's Compensation
by Jack E. Goshkin*
The most significant trend and development in workmen's
compensation law in the past year has been the activity of
the appellate courts in annulling and reversing the decisions
of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board.! With the
Labor Code's severe limitations on the scope of judicial review
of WCAB decisions,2 particularly on the right of the courts
to review factual determinations, and with most of the WCAB
cases containing factual rather than legal questions, the majority of petitions for writ of review have been and still are
being denied. 3
* J.D. 1961, Golden Gate College,
School of Law. Partner: Goshkin and
Pollatsek. Member, California State
Bar.
The author extends his appreciation
to Bernard Garber, student at Golden
Gate College, School of Law, for assistance in preparation of this article.
1. Hereinafter referred to as WCAB.
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

2. See Cal. Lab. Code §§ 5952, 5953,
and discussion infra.
3. WACB Chairman Morton Colvin
has stated that of the 143 cases which
were appealed from action of the
WCAB between January and September
1, of 1968, the appeals board action
was sustained in 121 cases. While Mr.
Colvin did not state the number of
CAL LAW 1969

99

1

Compensation
Cal Law Trends andWorkmen's
Developments, Vol.
1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 7

The character of the questions presented to the WCAB
has not changed; the questions remain primarily factual.
However, the frequency with which the courts annulled WCAB
decisions has increased noticeably in the past year. 4 A review
of the cases points up the changed attitude of the courts in
interpretation of Labor Code section 5952 and its "substantial evidence rule." Future effect of the appellate courts'
actions, in retreating from the long-standing interpretation of
section 5952, is of vital concern to any attorney practicing
in the field of workmen's compensation.
Another major trend of the past year has been the dramatic
reduction in the amount of litigation of workmen's compensation claims. In attempting a prediction of whether the
reduction in the number of claims will continue through future
years, California lawyers may consider the two new programs
introduced by the WCAB, which are discussed below.
Other developments in specific areas of workmen's compensation law are set forth in the latter portion of the article.
The Change of Judicial Attitude in Appellate Review of
WCAB Decisions

A reading of the WCAB cases in which judicial review was
granted between October 1, 1967 and October 15, 1968 reveals that the appellate courts are more and more reviewing
factual determinations of the WCAB. While the factual recases in which appeals board action was
sustained by denial of review, reading
the cases in the advance sheets would
lead one to believe that in only 2 or 3
cases at most was the board action
sustained in cases where review was
granted.
4. A count of the WCAB cases reported in California Compensation
Cases for the years 1965, 1966, 1967
and through October 1968 reveals that
in 1965, the action of the WCAB was
reviewed in a total of 28 cases and
affirmed in 12 of those cases; in 1966,
the WCAB action was affirmed in 12 of
28 cases and in 1967, the WCAB was
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affirmed in 12 of 29 cases. Through
October of 1968, the WCAB was
reversed or annulled in 42 of 52
cases granted review. In an address
given before workmen's compensation
referees and attorneys in San Diego on
October 8, 1968, Supreme Court Justice
Stanley Mosk said: ". . . A mere
cursory reading of the advance sheets
of both the Court of Appeal and the
Supreme Court reveals that a greater
number of Workmen's Compensation
Appeals Board awards have been annulled in the years 1967 and 1968 than
in any similar period in the state's
recorded judicial history."
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view was sometimes managed in a rather oblique manner,
the increased interest of the courts in the factual determinations
of the WCAB is bound to have an impact on California
Workmen's Compensation Law. In fact, there may well
have been a tacit change in the "substantial evidence rule"
as it applies to the determinations of the WCAB.
Before reviewing some of the cases in which the courts
have disagreed with the factual determinations of the WCAB
and accordingly annulled or reversed its decisions, a brief
outline of the statutory restrictions on appellate review and
court interpretations of those statutes 5 will point up the
changed attitude of the courts.
Labor Code section 5952 6 sets forth the general scope of
judicial review of WCAB decisions. It restates the "substantial evidence rule" as applied generally to administrative
bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions and provides in part
that nothing in the section shall permit the court to exercise
its independent judgment on the evidence. Section 5953 7
provides in part that the findings and conclusions of the
appeals board on questions of fact are conclusive and final and
not subject to review.
In interpreting those statutes, the courts have held that an
5. All sections referred to are from
the Labor Code, unless otherwise
indicated.
6. Cal. Lab. Code § 5952. The review by the court shall not be extended
further than to determine, based upon
the entire record which shall be certified by the appeals board, whether:
(a) The appeals board acted without
or in excess of its powers.
(b) The order, decision, or award
was procured by fraud.
(c) The order, decision, or award
was unreasonable.
(d) The order, decision, or award
was not supported by substantial evidence.
(e) If findings of fact are made, such
findings of fact support the order, decision, or award under review.

Nothing in this section shall permit
the court to hold a trial de novo, to
take evidence, or to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence.
The
7. Cal. Lab. Code § 5953.
findings and conclusions of the appeals
board on questions of fact are conclusive and final and are not subject to
review. Such questions of fact shall
include ultimate facts and the findings
and conclusions of the appeals board.
The appeals board and each party to
the action or proceeding before the
appeals board shall have the right to
appear in the review proceeding. Upon the hearing, the court shall enter
judgment either affirming or annulling
the order, decision, or award, or the
court may remand the case for further
proceedings before the appeals board.
CAL LAW 1969
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award of the WCAB 8 would not be disturbed unless there was
an entire lack of evidence to support it and that the court
could not be concerned with conflicts in the evidence. 9 If
the findings of the WCAB were supported by inferences which
could be fairly drawn from evidence, even though the evidence
was susceptible of opposing inferences, the reviewing court
would not disturb the award. IO If a decision of the WCAB
could be supported on any ground, it became immaterial that
other grounds were improper. l l In reviewing an award rendered by the WCAB, the court was required to indulge in all
reasonable inferences to support the board's finding.12 Findings of the WCAB were to be interpreted liberally in favor
of sustaining an award, even where reference to the record
was required. 13 The WCAB, and not the court, was authorized to draw inferences from the evidence and base conclusions
thereon.14 The WCAB's findings of fact were not subject
to review where it could not be said that no reasonable man
could reach the conclusion that the board reached. 15
The number of cases in which the courts declined to review
or overturn the findings of the WCAB is legion. Succinctly
stated, the "substantial evidence rule" has been applied to
WCAB decisions. The courts have refused to weigh or to
re-evaluate the evidence; they merely isolate that evidence
which could support the decision, and if there was any such
evidence, the WCAB's action was affirmed.
One may wonder how an appellate court could possibly
bridge the vast sea of precedent limiting and restricting its
8. The judicial functions of the old
Industrial Accident Commission were
transferred to the WCAB January 15,
1966.
9. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 18 Cal.2d
40, 112 P.2d 615 (1941).
10. Riskin v. Industrial Accident
Comm., 23 Cal.2d 248, 144 P.2d 16
(1943).
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11. Sweeney v. Industrial Accident
Comm., 107 Cal. App.2d 155, 236
P.2d 651 (1951).
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12. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm., 28 Cal.2d 329, 170
P .2d 18 (1946).
13. Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm., 40 Cal.2d 102, 251
P.2d 955 (1953).
14. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co. v.
Industrial Accident Comm., 2 Cal.2d
685, 43 P.2d 282 (1935).
15. Carmichael v. Industrial Accident
Comm., 234 Cal. App.2d 311, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 470 (1965).

4

Goshkin: Workmen's Compensation

Workmen's Compensation

right to disagree with the WCAB's view of the evidence. But
in 1967, the courts apparently discovered section 5908.5 of
the Labor Code I6 which had been added in 1951 and amended
to its present form in 1955. That section proved to be the
span needed. It requires the WCAB to state the evidence
upon which it relies and to specify in detail the reasons for
its decision when it affirms, rescinds, alters, or amends an
original finding of a referee. 17
The first application of section 5908.5 appeared in the
case of Wilhelm v. WCAB/ 8 decided October 5, 1967. The
applicant for workmen's compensation benefits was a school
nurse who alleged disability by reason of contracting herpes
zoster from exposure to chickenpox in the course of her employment. The referee found industrial injury and defendant
petitioned for reconsideration. The WCAB granted reconsideration, vacated the referee's findings and award, and issued
an order denying benefits. In her petition for a writ of review,
the applicant contended that, in finding that she did not sustain industrial injury, the board disregarded the substantial
evidence to the contrary. In its answer to applicant's petition
for a writ, the WCAB contended that there was "some evi16. Cal. Lab. Code § 5908.5. Any
decision of the appeals board granting
or denying a petition for reconsideration or affirming, rescinding, altering,
or amending the original findings, order,
decision, or award following reconsideration shall be made by the appeals
board and not by a referee and shall
be in writing, signed by a majority of
the appeals board members assigned
thereto, and shall state the evidence relied upon and specify in detail the
reasons for the decision.
17. Workmen's Compensation cases
are initially heard by a trial referee
who decides all issues of fact and law
presented. Any person aggrieved by
the referee's final decision may petition
the seven-man appeals board for reconsideration.
Such petItIOns are
usually considered and decided by ro-
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tating panels of three board members.
If the questions presented are deemed
of sufficieni importance, all seven members of the board will consider and
decide a petition for reconsideration
en banco The board may grant or
deny reconsideration. If reconsideration is granted, the board may, with or
without proceedings, affirm, rescind,
alter or amend the referee's order,
award, or decision (§§ 5900-5911).
Any person "affected" by the board's
order, decision or award (including an
order denying reconsideration) may
apply to the supreme court or the court
of appeal for a writ of review for the
purpose of inquiring into and determining the lawfulness of the board's
action (§§ 5950-5956).
18. 255 Cal. App.2d 30, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 829 (1967).
CAL LAW 1969
103

5

Workmen's Compensation
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 7

dence" to support its finding. The court of appeal specifically
stated that it was not considering the question of sufficiency
of evidence, and that it was applying instead the provisions
of section 5908.5. The court stated:
In its decision after reconsideration the appeals board,
pursuant to Labor Code, section 5908.5, did not comment on the evidence but stated as the reason for its
decision that it found merit in the contention of respondents [defendants below] "that there is no evidence of
exposure of the applicant to an infectious or contagious
disease." Our review of the record shows that there is
substantial evidence on this issue and no reason appears
to justify its exclusion from consideration. 19
The court went on to recite the evidence in the record that
would support a finding of applicant's exposure to chickenpox and stated that there was no evidence that she was not
so exposed. One wonders why, if there was no evidence in
the record to support the WCAB's decision, the court of appeal
did not annul on that basis. If there was any evidence at all
in the record that, even though the applicant may have been
exposed to chickenpox during the course of her employment,
her own disease was not the result of such exposure, the
court, if it intended to comply with the historic limitations on
its right to review factual matters, had a duty to draw such
inference in support of the WCAB's denial of benefits.
Another application of section 5908.5 appeared in Evans
v. WCAB,20 decided by the California Supreme Court in
June of 1968. The referee had found the applicant not
barred from reopeping an old case by reason of incompetency.
The board, after granting defendant reconsideration, annulled
the referee's finding, ruling instead that the applicant's injury
did not cause further disability and that his claim was barred
by the limitations period. The court of appeal denied a writ
of review and the supreme court then granted review. In its
rather short decision, the court stated:
19. 255 Cal. App.2d at 32, 62 Cal.
Rptr. at 830.
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20. 68 Cal.2d 753, 68 Cal Rptr. 825,
441 P.2d 633 (1968).
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The only reference by the board to the evidence and to
the reasons for its decision was the statement that "We
have carefully reviewed the record in this matter and are
of the opinion that it is not established by the evidence
therein that applicant was incompetent as he alleges.
His petition to reopen which was filed on June 3, 1966
was therefore barred. "1
The court referred to section 5908.5, quoted a Public Utilities Commission decision 2 stating the purpose of the requirement that evidence be stated and reasons detailed, and found
that the WCAB had not regularly pursued its authority. The
court therefore annulled the decision.
In White v. WCAB,3 a widow received an award for death
benefits including a penalty for serious and wilful misconduct.
The WCAB granted defendant reconsideration, vacated the
referee's award, and found that the death was not caused by
serious and wilful misconduct of the employer. The court
of appeal granted review and, in a long decision, discussed
the evidence and safety orders applicable. The court said
that the WCAB had misinterpreted some of the applicable
safety regulations and further stated:
Apart from the board's evident misinterpretation of the
safety regulations, its opinion is significantly devoid of
any statement of the evidence relied upon and of any
statement of the reasons for its ultimate decision. The
decision thus fails to comply with section 5908.5 of the
Labor Code. 4
1. 68 Cal.2d at 754, 68 Cal. Rptr.
at 826, 441 P.2d at 634.
2. "The purpose of the requirement
that evidence be stated and reasons
detailed appears analogous to that of
the requirement of section 1705 of the
Public Utilities Code that decisions of
the Public Utilities Commission contain separately stated findings of the
basic facts upon all material issues.
It is to assist the reviewing court to
ascertain the principles relied upon by
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the lower tribunal, to help that tribunal
avoid careless or arbitrary action, and
to make the right of appeal or of seeking review more meaningful." Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Util.
Comm., 65 Cal.2d 811, 56 Cal. Rptr.
484, 423 P.2d 556 (1967).
3. 265 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr.
49 (1968).
4. 265 Cal. App.2d at - , 71 Cal.
Rptr. at 55.
CAL LAW 1969
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The court annulled the WCAB decision and remanded it
for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed
in its opinion.
Why did the court feel it necessary to raise the question
of section 5908.5? It stated: "As we read the record the
evidence clearly sustains the findings of the referee that this
element of serious and willful misconduct of the employer
had been established." (The court did not address itself to
the question of whether there was any evidence in the record
to sustain the WCAB's decision.) The court could simply
have found that by a misinterpretation of a safety order, the
WCAB had made an error of law; it did not need to refer
to section 5908.5 or to the evidence.
In the case of Brennfieck v. WCAB,5 the court of appeal
annulled a decision after reconsiderations vacating a referee's
award of death benefits to an alleged widow. The stated
reason for the annulment was the WCAB's failure to state
the evidence relied upon and to detail the reasons for its
action as required by section 5908.5. The primary question
in Brennfieck was whether the petitioner could qualify for
death benefits as a widow or putative spouse of an employee
killed in the course of his employment. The court outlined
the evidence that would support a finding that the petitioner
was a putative spouse and stated that "There is uncontradicted
proof-all of it substantial-to indicate that petitioner in
good faith believed she was legally married to Carl and that
Carl joined in that belief."6 Again, the court did not discuss
the question of whether there was any evidence in the record,
or any evidence from which inferences could be made, to
support the WCAB's decision. Why, if there were no substantial eviden~e in the record to support the WCAB's decision, did the court have to rely on section 5908.5?
The case of Holcomb v. WCAB 7 is unusual in the class of
5. 265 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr.
525 (1968).
6. 265 Cal. App.2d at - , 71 Cal.
Rptr. at 530.
106
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7. 266 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr.
874 (1968).
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cases now under discussion. This is not a case in which the
WCAB overturned an original decision of a referee. Rather,
it is one in which a referee granted an award for permanent
disability but denied further medical treatment. . After applicant's petition for reconsideration was denied, she petitioned
for review. The review was granted and the court annulled
the order denying reconsideration on the ground that it did
not comply with section 5908.5. The court, after pointing out
that the WCAB had stated it had carefully reviewed the record
and had quoted from one medical report, nevertheless found
that such a statement was not in compliance with the requirements of section 5908.5. The court noted that the extensive
quotations from the record in the board's answer to the petition
for review did not meet the requirements of section 5908.5
because of that section's provision that the WCAB shall state
in its decision the evidence on which it relied.
If the WCAB could quote extensively from the record in
support of its decision in its brief, there must have been some
favorable evidence which the court could have used to uphold
the decision had it wished to abide by its traditional refusal
to reweigh and re-evaluate the evidence.
In the case of Granado v. WeAB s the supreme court annulled a decision of the WCAB apportioning temporary disability and medical treatment between an industrial injury
and a pre-existing non-industrial condition. The WCAB's
decision had been upheld by the district court of appeal, 9
but the supreme court noted that the question before it had not
been squarely decided and then discussed the statutes and the
cases applicable. After deciding that apportionment was not
in order as a matter of law, the court stated that the decision
had to be annulled for another reason-the WCAB had not
complied with section 5908.5 in setting forth its reasons for
allowing apportionment. It would seem from this decision
that, as a matter of law, the WCAB could not apportion
medical treatment and temporary disability between an indus8. 69 Cal.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr. 678,
445 P.2d 294 (1968).

9. 258 A.C.A. 131, 65 Cal. Rptr.
523 (1968).
CAL LAW 1969
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trial injury and a non-industrial condition would be a sufficient basis on which to annul the WCAB's decision. 10
Lundberg v. WCAB lJ is perhaps the most interesting of the
cases in which the courts have relied at least in part on
section 5908.5 to support annulment of WCAB decisions.
More openly than the other cases, it reveals the supreme
court's discontent with the WCAB's factual determinations.
In Lundberg one of the two reporting doctors gave no opinion
as to the cause of injury. The other doctor stated:
I do not know what caused the 4th lumbar intervertebral
disc to rupture. It is possible that his work activity
between 5-8-67 and the onset of symptoms on 6-27-67
was responsible for this rupture but it is equally possible
that the rupture would have occurred had he not been
working at all. 12

The referee found that the petitioner suffered injury to his
lower back arising out of and in the course of his employment.
The defendant's petition for reconsideration was granted and
the WCAB discussed the reports of the doctors and concluded
that the applicant had not met his burden of proof to establish
that his injury was industrially caused. In annulling the decision of the WCAB, the court devoted most of its opinion to
a discussion of the applicant's burden of proof and to the
Labor Code's direction that provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act are to be liberally construed. 13
The court engaged in a neat bit of semantic sleight of hand
by severing that portion of the medical opinion quoted above
which states that "it would be equally possible that the rupture
would have occurred had he [the appplicant] not been working
at all," and by characterizing that portion as "at most neutral."
The court then found the first part of the sentence which
caused
states "it is possible that his work activities.
the rupture," along with applicant's testimony that he had
10. 69 Cal.2d at - , 71 Cal. Rptr.
at 683, 445 P.2d at 299-300.
11. 69 Cal.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr. 684,
445 P.2d 300 (1968).
108
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at 685, 445 P.2d at 301.
13. Cal. Lab. Code § 3202.
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his onset of pains at work, to constitute undisputed evidence
that "points toward" an industrial injury. The court went
on to say that the WCAB had means by which it could have
resolved its doubts as to causation (by taking additional evidence, having the applicant examined by a physician) but that
the board had not followed these procedures and had, instead,
determined ". . . in the absence of any supporting evidence
to reject the inference of industrial causation, and this it may
not do.,,14 (Emphasis added.) The court then brought up
section 5908.5 and expressed grave doubt of the board's
compliance with that requirement:
The board has failed to point in its decision to any valid
basis for rejecting the inference of industrial causation
arising from the undisputed facts and Dr. Haldeman's
report.
. , The board has failed to set forth the
undisputed evidence that the symptoms occurred when
petitioner was engaged in the kind of work which could
cause the injury, and has failed to furnish any reason
to ignore it. 15
Obviously a reasonable man could as easily infer from the
medical report that the injury was not industrially caused
as he could infer, as the court did, that it was industrially
caused. Therefore, the court would be hard put to annul
the decision in Lundberg on the ground that there was no
evidence whatsoever in the record to sustain the decision
of the WCAB. It is apparent that the court was in fact exercising its independent judgment on the evidence16 and was
most certainly reviewing the findings and conclusions of the
WCAB on questions of fact both of which activities are prohibited by statute. 17
In all the above cases, the courts have relied, at least in
part, on section 5908.5 to annul WCAB denials of workmen's
compensation benefits where they thought there was substantial evidence in the record to support a decision granting those
14. 69 Ca1.2d at - , 71 Cal. Rptr.
at 686, 445 P.2d at 302.
15. 69 Cal.2d at - , 71 Cal. Rptr.
at 687, 445 P.2d at 303.

*

16. See Cal. Lab. Code 5952.
17. See Cal. Lab. Code § 5953.

CAL LAW 1969
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benefits. If the records in the cases above had been entirely
devoid of any evidence in support of the WCAB's decisions
denying benefits, the courts could, and probably would, forthrightly annul the awards on the ground that there was no
substantial evidence to support the WCAB. In the past year,
the courts have not been bashful about annulling WCAB
awards on grounds other than section 5908.5 and have in
several cases annulled the awards on the ground that there
was no substantial evidence to support the WCAB's decision.
In Clem mens v. WCAB 18 the referee found that death did
not arise out of and occur in the course of employment; the
petition for reconsideration was denied. The court of appeal
annulled the ruling on the ground that the referee's opinion
stated that the cause of death had not been determined and
that it was required of the board to resolve the conflicting
evidence on the cause of death. The decision, devoted largely
to a discussion of the reasons for holding deaths from unknown
causes occurring in the course of employment as compensable,
admonished the WCAB that it was bound by the fundamental
principle that all reasonable doubts as to whether an injury
is compensable are to be resolved in favor of the employee.
However, the court overlooked the statutory prohibition on
its power to review the evidence.
In Jones v. WCAB/ 9 the supreme court annulled an order
of the WCAB overturning a referee's award of compensation
benefits, addressing itself to the question of whether the
claimant had suffered new and further disability resulting
from a 1961 injury for which he had already been awarded
a 42 percent permanent disability on November 10, 1965.
In reversing the referee, the WCAB relied upon medical
reports that had been filed during earlier proceedings. The
court held that it was error for the WCAB to do so. While
the court does not clearly so state, it appears that it annulled
on the ground that there was no substantial evidence to support the WCAB's decision and the evidence upon which the
WCAB relied was no longer germane to the question. Sim18. 261 Cal. App.2d I, 68 Cal. Rptr.
804 (1968).
110
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544. 439 P .2d 648 (1968).
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ilarly, in Berry v. WCAB,20 Zemke v. WCAB/ and Zurich
Insurance v. WCAB,2 the courts annulled WCAB decisions
on the ground that there was no substantial evidence to support those decisions.
The court's overturning of so many WCAB decisions in so
short a period on the ground that the decisions were not
supported by substantial evidence might, in itself, be indicative of a trend. However, the most significant development
has been the courts' use of section 5908.5 to annul decisions
in which they believed, after reweighing and reinterpreting
the evidence, that the evidence supporting an award for benefits had not been given sufficient weight by the WCAB.
Section 5908.5 has been in effect in its present form since
1955, but research has failed to discover a single case prior
to October, 1967 in which the courts have annulled decisions
on the ground that the WCAB had not complied with the
provisions of that section-in spite of prior presentations of
that argument to the courts. Prior to 1967, cases presenting
the 5908.5 argument to the courts had been denied review. 3
The present trend appears to be that the court will review
the evidence and annul the award where it believes that there is
no substantial evidence to support the WCAB award. Where
there is some evidence to support the WCAB's denial of benefits but, in the court's view, a preponderance of evidence to
support granting benefits, the trend is to annul the award
on the ground that the WCAB had not complied with section
5908.5. No doubt this tactic has caught the WCAB by sur20. 68 Cal.2d 786, 69 Cal. Rptr.
68, 441 P.2d 908 (1968).
1. 68 Cal.2d 794, 69 Cal. Rptr. 88,
441 P.2d 928 (1968).
2. 33 C.c.c. 569 (1968) (opinion not
published in official reports).
3. Arabian American Oil Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 17 C.C.c.
54 (1952); Romeo v. Industrial Accident Comm., 21 c.c.c. 280 (1956);
Andreini v. Industrial Accident Comm.,
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23 c.c.c. 68 (1958); Schader v Industrial Accident Comm., 28 C.C.c. 240
(1963); Wray v. Industrial Accident
Comm., 29 C.C.C. 248 (1964); Daly v.
Industrial Accident Comm., 30 C.C.C.
214 (1965); Chew Investments v. Industrial Accident Comm., 30 C.c.c. 299
(1965); Spreckels Sugar Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm., 30 C.C.C. 294
(1965); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 30 C.C.C.
389 (1965).
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19. 68 Cal.2d 476. 67 Cal. Rptr.
544. 439 P.2d 648 (1968).

prise. Section 5908.5, in effect in its present form for some
12 years, had never before been used by the courts.
Although it has been generally understood that the WCAB
need not make negative findings but only specify by its
findings the evidence upon which it rested its decision, setting
forth findings limited to affirmative ultimate facts/ it now
appears that, where the WCAB denies benefits, the courts
want the board to set forth the evidence it has rejected and
to explain its rejection.
From the many admonitions in the decisions that the workmen's compensation law must be liberally construed in favor
of granting benefits, it is doubtful that the courts will indulge
in the use of section 5908.5 to overturn any decision that
grants benefits. Further, it is doubtful that the courts will
overturn any decision granting benefits where there is any
evidence whatsoever in the record, either directly or by inference, to support an award granting compensation benefits.
It does appear, however, that the courts, and particularly the
supreme court, will no longer confine their search of the
record to an attempt to determine whether there is any evidence or inference that could support the WCAB decision in
those cases where the WCAB has denied compensation benefits, but will re-evaluate and reinterpret the evidence to determine whether the WCAB has resolved all doubts and engaged
in all possible inferences in favor of granting benefits.

Reduction of Litigation
For the first time in some thirteen years, the number of original applications for hearing filed with the WCAB has decreased. Over the past ten years, the average annual increase
in original filings has been 8.7 percent. For the first six
months of 1968, there was a 4 percent decrease in original
filings when compared to the corresponding period for the
preceding year. 5 The reasons for the rather dramatic decrease
4. Alexander v. WCAB, 262 Cal.2d
-, 69 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1968).
5. Statistics taken from a speech
delivered by Morton R. Colvin, Chair112
CAL LAW 1969

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/7

man, WCAB, September 16, 1968, to
the International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions.

14

Goshkin: Workmen's Compensation

Workmen's Compensation

in the filing of original applications are not definitely ascertainable but may be due to recent programs developed by
the WCAB to reduce litigation.
Under authority granted by Labor Code section 138.4,
effective January 15, 1966, the Division of Industrial Accidents enacted regulations requiring that employees receive
notice of payment and non-payment of benefits, termination
of benefits, and an accounting of benefits paid, and that insurance companies provide copies of such notices to the division.
In compiling reports, copies of notices of payment as received
by the division are fed into computers; every six months a
report is prepared covering the previous twelve-month period.
These published reports set forth a statistically developed
listing of insurance companies and self-insureds in a descending order of promptness of first payments to injured employees. Those companies who find themselves at the bottom of
the list generally strive to improve their position before the
next list is published.
The effectiveness of this program in improving the promptness with which first payments are issued is shown by a
contrast of studies made in 1963 and in 1968. The 1963
study indicated that benefit payments were made by the
fourteenth day after injury in only 19 percent of all cases.
In 1968, some two years after the reporting procedure was
instituted, first payments were made by the fourteenth day
after beginning of disability in over 68 percent of the cases. 6
Another possible reason for reduction of litigation is the
"Procedure to Reduce Workmen's Compensation Litigation,"
issued by the WCAB in October of 1967. Basically, the
procedures are an attempt to avoid the filing of applications
before the case is ready for decision. It had been found
that, in many cases, applications were filed when injured
employees first visited an attorney even though they were
receiving all benefits to which they were entitled and were
not yet ready for permanent disability rating. The basic tool
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of the procedure to reduce litigation is a form which injured
employees' attorneys send to insurance companies or selfinsured employers requesting information and stipulations.
Whether the reduction in litigation is due to the procedures
to reduce litigation or to the more prompt payment of first
disability benefits is still questionable. When an injured
employee is promptly put on temporary disability and receives
his first temporary disability check within two weeks, he is
far less likely to consult an attorney. When the employer
or carrier is dilatory in instituting temporary disability benefits, the injured employee wants his status determined and
seeks legal counsel or files an application for a hearing on
his own behalf. Therefore, it is probable that the reduction
of filings is more closely related to the great increase in prompt
payment of first benefits than it is to the procedures to reduce
litigation.
Regardless of the reason, the filing of original applications
for hearing is markedly reduced for the first time in many
years. Whether that reduction will mean an actual reduction of litigated cases remains to be seen. Perhaps the effect
of the procedures instituted by the WCAB will be merely to
delay the filing of applications. It will probably take a year
or two to determine whether workmen's compensation litigation in California has actually been reduced.
Apportionment of Liability

Basically, there are only two types of apportionment in
workmen's compensation law: (1) the apportioning of liability for a single disability between multiple employers or
insurance carriers where the employee's disability is due to a
continuous injury or occupational disease; and (2) the apportioning of liability for an employee's disability between multiple causes. Significant developments have appeared in both
areas of the law of apportionment during the past year.
Apportionment for Multiple Causes

The question whether an employer's liability for temporary
disability and medical treatment could be apportioned between
114
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an industrial injury and a pre-existing non-industrial condition
had not been squarely decided by the courts before this year.
The WCAB had simply taken the position that such apportionment was not required by section 4663. 7 Those cases which
had attacked the WCAB interpretationS were decided on other
grounds. In Granado v. WCAB 9 the supreme court announced that there may be no apportionment of the liability
for temporary disability payments or medical treatment between industrial injuries and non-industrial injuries. While
the couJt, discussed only apportionment between industrial
injuries and non-industrial injuries, its reasoning suggests that
apportionment will not be permitted between industrial injuries and any pre-existing non-industrial condition, regardless
of the cause of the pre-existing medical problem.
Granado did not work any change in the law as understood
by most practitioners in the field. Prior to Granado the
WCAB had consistently taken the position that, while it
could apportion temporary disability and medical treatment,
it was not required to do so by the statute and that it did
not make such apportionment as a matter of policy. Attacks
on the WCAB's refusal to apportion temporary disability
and medical treatment had always failed. Therefore, there
was a general acceptance of the rule that temporary disability
and medical treatment would not be apportioned. What
Granado did was to remove a nagging doubt and to change
an administrative policy into a rule of law.
The rules for apportioning permanent disability between
the effects of an industrial injury and a pre-existing condition
were reviewed and redefined twice by the supreme court during the past year .10 In both decisions the court disagreed
7. Cal. Lab. Code § 4663. In case
of aggravation of any disease existing
prior to a compensable injury, compensation shall be allowed only for the
proportion of the disability due to the
aggravation of such prior disease which
is reasonably attributed to the injury.
8. Fred Gledhill Chevrolet v. Industrial Accident Comm., 62 Cal.2d 59,
41 Cal. Rptr. 170,396 P.2d 586 (1964);
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American Can Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 196 Cal. App.2d 445, 16
Cal. Rptr. 424 (1961).
9. 69 Cal.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr. 678,
445 P.2d 294 (1968).
10. Zemke v. WCAB, 68 Cal.2d 794,
69 Cal. Rptr. 88, 441 P.2d 928 (1968);
Berry v. WCAB, 68 Cal.2d 786, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 68, 441 P.2d 908 (1968).
CAL LAW 1969
115

17

Workmen's Compensation
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 7

with the WCAB's interpretation of the medical evidence and
held that the board's awards were not supported by substantial evidence. The two cases did not state any new principles of law, but they are interesting only as an indication
of the court's resolve to deny apportionment unless the medical
evidence supporting it is stated in a set formula.
Subsequent to these decisions, the court of appeal faced
the same questionl l and concluded:
. . . [W]hile the employer is liable for that portion
of the total disability caused by the industrial injury,
he is not liable for the part of the disability which". . .
would have resulted, in the absence of the industrial
injury, from the 'normal progress' of the pre-existing
disease. "12
It would seem that unless the medical opinions use the
terminology "x percent of the employee's present disability
would have resulted in the absence of the industrial injury
from the normal progress of the pre-existing disease," the
courts do not find apportionment permissible. 13
Apportionment for Continuous Trauma Injuries

In the nine years since Beveridge v. Industrial Accident
Commission,14 continuous trauma cases have burgeoned to
a point where they deserve a classification of their own.
Probably the major development in continuous trauma cases
in the past year was the complete confusion caused by three
11. Peterson v. WCAB, 266 Cal. App.
2d - , 72 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968).
12. 266 Cal. App.2d at - , 72 Cal.
Rptr. at 548.
13. In Fine v. WCAB, 32 C.C.c. 492
(1967), (opinion not published in official reports) which was decided by the
court of appeal prior to the two supreme
court cases mentioned, the court was
content with medical testimony that
"The bulk of his (employee's) problem
predated the injury," and that the in116
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However, it annulled the appeals board's
decision denying the applicant benefits
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14. 175 Cal. App.2d 592, 246 P.2d
545 (1959).
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appellate decisions: Dow Chemical Company v. WCAB/ 5
De Luna v. WCAB/ 6 and Miller v. WCAB.17 In these cases
the courts apparently attempted to restructure the law of
continuous trauma, and in doing so, set forth decisions with
effects so troublesome that eventual amendments and additions to the Labor Code were enacted to offset them.Is
The Dow case concerned itself with whether the WCAB
was bound by its final decisions granting permanent disability ratings for two specific injuries when considering the
same employee's claim for disability for a period of continuous
trauma which encompassed the dates of specific injuries. The
same workmen's compensation insurance carriers were defendants in the continuous trauma case as had been held liable
for the specific incidents. The WCAB found that the employee's total permanent disability at the end of the period
of continuous trauma was 75 percent and that he was due a
life pension. The WCAB granted credit to the carriers who
had been held liable for the specific injuries in the amount
of their liability for those injuries. But the supreme court
held that the action of the WCAB was improper since ". . .
any injury which produced by itself a definable disability
should not be submerged in a series of injuries with indemnity
being awarded for repetitive trauma."19 The court pointed
out that the constructive date of the continuous trauma injury
was the time when it finally resulted in disability (at the end
of the period) and, as the two specific injuries had occurred
prior to that date, section 4750 of the Labor Code would
preclude the board from lumping the disabilities awarded in
the specific incidents with the total disability.
The employee in Dow had also petitioned for subsequent
injuries fund benefits but that claim had been denied by the
board. The supreme court reversed the board and adopted
the rule, for the purpose of the subsequent injuries statutes,
15. 67 Cal.2d 483, 62 Cal. Rptr. 757,
432 P.2d 365 (1967).
16. 258 Cal. App.2d 199, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 421 (1968).
17. 258 Cal. App.2d 490, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 835 (1968).
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18. Assembly Daily Journal, Sept. 10,
1968, pp. 21 and 22.
19. 67 Ca1.2d at 492, 62 Cal. Rptr.
at 763, 432 P.2d at 371.
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that a cumulative injury will be deemed to have been incurred
. the last day of the period in which the WCAB
on ".
finds that cumulative injury was received by repetitive exposure to stress or other cause; or, if disability does not appear
until yet a later date, the time when the employee becomes
disabled."20 The court pointed out that adopting that date
would make the two specific injuries prior in time and provide
a basis for holding the subsequent injuries fund liable for
benefits.
De Luna was decided by the court of appeal some three
months after Dow. De Luna filed a claim on November 2,
1966, alleging a specific incident of injury occurring on July
16, 1962. He also filed a separate claim alleging continuous
trauma from July, 1960 and thereafter. The WCAB found
the claim of specific injury barred by the statute of limitations
but granted benefits for the continuous trauma injury. The
court of appeal ruled that the board had erred in holding
the claim for specific injury barred by the statute of limitations, reasoning that the incident of specific injury ".
should have been considered as an integral part of the applicant's claim for cumulative injuries."l In arriving at its
decision the court stated, without citation of authority:
"While the applicant may file both a claim of specific
injury and a claim of cumulative injury covering the
same period of time, he may not have an award on both
nor is disability, either temporary or permanent, to be
apportioned between the two claims."2
The De Luna decision would seem to be specifically contrary to Dow, yet the supreme court refused hearing.
In Miller the WCAB again found an incident of specific
injury barred by the statute of limitations, but allowed recovery
on a claim for continuous trauma. Again the court disagreed
with the board's finding and annulled the decision on the
20. 67 Cal.2d at 493, 62 Cal. Rptr.
at 764, 432 P.2d at 372.
1. 258 Cal. App.2d at 204, 65 Cal.
Rptr. at 425.
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ground that the board should have considered the specific
as the first of many exacerbations
incident alleged ".
causing the cumulative injury, and should have taken that
injury into consideration in determining whether the applicant
sustained a cumulative injury which had its inception on that
date."3 Again, though Miller is seemingly contrary to Dow,
the supreme court denied hearing.
The WCAB, as well as most practitioners in the field of
workmen's compensation, were completely confused by the
Dow, De Luna, and Miller cases. In an attempt to set forth
its understanding of those cases, the board wrote a twentypage en bane opinion in Burris v. Southern California Rapid
Transit Distriet,4 wherein it reviewed and set forth the many
procedural problems raised by the three troublesome cases
and made a statement of its understanding of the procedures
now required of the WCAB in the light of the holdings of
these cases. Even though legislation subsequent to the cases
may have solved some of the problems, the author strongly
recommends that anyone interested in continuous trauma cases
read and reread the Burris decision. What action, if any, the
appellate courts will take on Burris is not known at the time
of this writing.
In an attempt to offset the problems raised by the Dow,
De Luna, and Miller decisions, the legislature, in the First
Extraordinary session, enacted Assembly Bill 1 which became
effective January 1, 1969. This bill added section 3208.1
to the Labor Code to provide that an injury, for the purposes
of workmen's compensation law, may be "specific" or "cumulative" as defined therein and that the date of cumulative injury "shall be the date of disability caused thereby." The
bill also added section 3208.2 to the Labor Code to provide
that when disability, need for medical treatment, or death
results from the combined effects of two or more injuries,
either specific or cumulative or both, all questions of fact
and law shall be separately determined with respect to each
injury. This section of the code specifically provides for
3. 258 Cal. App.2d at 496-497, 65
Cal. Rptr. at 838.

4. 33 C.C.C. 419 (1968).
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apportionment between such injuries. An amendment to section 5305 added the provision that no one injury, whether
specific or cumulative, shall for any purpose merge into or
form a part of another injury.
Whether these amendments and additions will clarify cumulative injury proceedings and awards, or add to the confusion,
remains to be seen. The WCAB is adopting the policy that
the additions and amendments to the Labor Code just discussed are substantive in nature and therefore will not have
any effect in causes of action arising before the January 1,
1969 effective date. 5
Does a specific incident of injury occurring before January
1, 1969, merge with a continuous trauma resulting in disability
after that date? The question remains unanswered pending
judicial interpretation of the new sections and amendment.
In Fruehauf Corp. v. WCAR 6 the supreme court decided
that the date of injury in continuous trauma cases should
be that set forth in section 5412, which had previously been
held to apply only to occupational disease cases rather than
the date set forth in section 5411, which states that it is to
be applicable "except in cases of occupational disease." The
importance of this determination is that it affects the running
of the statute of limitations, which does not begin to run until
the "date of injury."
Section 5411, which had been held applicable to all injuries
other than occupational disease injuries and which had previously bee-n the section used to determine the date of injury
in cumulative trauma cases, in effect holds that the date of
injury is the date of last exposure. Section 5412, which
previously had been applicable only to occupational disease
cases, provides that the date of injury is the date upon which
the employee first suffered disability from the disease, "and
either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should
5. Memorandum to all referees and
attorneys, dated September 30, 1968,
from Morton R. Colvin, Chairman,
WCAB and its attached statement of
policy.
120
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have known, that said disability was caused by his present or
prior employment." Many occupational disease cases have
been brought years after last exposure and disability under
the theory that the injured employee did not know, and with
the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have known,
that his disability was work-connected.
The WCAB has frequently applied the "occupational disease" rule to what would appear to be continuous trauma
injuries by the simple expedient of finding that the injured
employee suffered from an "occupational disease."7
The court's change in date of injury in continuous trauma
cases, as affected by Fruehauf, may apply only to causes of
action accruing prior to January 1, 1969. The new section
3208.1, which was effective on that date, specifically provides
that the date of injury in continuous trauma cases ".
shall be the date of disability caused thereby." (Caveat-the
courts have yet to interpret that provision.)
Earnings
In recent years, the question of whether fringe benefits
should be included in calculating an employee's average earnings has been litigated more and more often. In Norton v.
North American Aviation, Inc. s the WCAB decided that those
fringe benefits which are continued during an injured employee's period of disability should not be included in determining average weekly earnings for the purpose of calculating
an injured employee's weekly temporary disability rate. AB
1, effective January 1, 1969, which amended section 4454,
further clarified the question of what is to be included in
"earnings" by adding the following phrase:
. . . [N]or shall there be included either the cost or
the market value of any savings, wage continuation, wage
replacement, or stock acquisition program or of any
employee benefit programs for which the employer pays
7. See, for example, Aerojet-General
Corp. v. WCAB, 32 c.e.c. 398 (1967).

8. 32

c.c.c. 498 (1967).
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or contributes to persons other than the employee or
his family.
This phrase would seem to excluded those fringe benefits
paid to union welfare funds and insurance companies from
earnings. As benefits paid directly to an employee or his
family have always been considered properly included in the
average weekly earnings, it seems that now the old question
of fringe benefits will no longer be troublesome.
Employee-Employer Relationship

Baby sitters have been excluded from the benefits of workmen's compensation by statutory amendment. Labor Code
section 3352(f), which excludes those persons engaged in
household domestic service except where employed by one
employer for over 52 hours per week, has been amended
to include those persons engaged in part-time care and supervision of children in a private residence. A baby sitter not
employed for more than 52 hours a week by the same employer
will not be able to claim workmen's compensation benefits
after January 1, 1969. Whether a baby sitter working less
than 52 hours a week could have claimed compensation benefits before this amendment is questionable. The status of
baby sitters has not been directly decided by the courts and
there has been much speculation that they might be excluded
under section 3352(f) even without the amendment.
Injury Arising out of and in the Course of Employment
Death by Suicide

Prior to 1960, death benefits were not allowed to widows
of employees who died by their own hands. While the Labor
Code made no mention of suicide as such, section 3600 (e)
provided (and still provides) that an injury is compensable
"where the injury is not intentionally self-inflicted." (Emphasis added.) Before 1960, the WCAB and courts held
that the quoted section precluded the granting of death benefits where the injured employee died by his own hand, even
if the suicide was the proximate result of an industrial injury.
122
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The WCAB did recognize, however, the possibility that a
suicide might be compensable. Alexander v. California Department of Insurance,9 decided in 1948, denied death benefits,
but stated that such benefits could be allowed where the
industrial injury resulted in an insanity".
such as to
cause the employee to take his own life through an unaccountable impulse or in a delirium or frenzy, without conscious
volition.
."10
However, the writer found no recorded
California case prior to 1960 in which the board actually
found that the industrial injury caused such an insanity.
In 1960, the court of appeal changed the test for compensability in Burnight v. Industrial Accident Commission.l1
The WCAB had found that the employee's nervous breakdown and manic-depressive psychosis arose out of and occurred in the course of his employment but denied death
benefits because of the testimony of a psychiatrist that the
deceased's act was voluntary and that he had the mental
capacity to, and did, realize the consequences of his act.
The court of appeal, in considering the case and the state of
the law at that time, stated: "We think that the test is and
should be, not did the employee know what he was doing,
but was the compulsion or the impulse to commit suicide
one which he could not resist.,,12 The court added, by way
of dicta, that if the industrial injury results in pain that the
employee believes to be unbearable, or if the employee becomes so depressed as a result of his injury that he thinks
suicide is the only way out, or if the industrial injury results
in any condition that causes the employee to feel that death
will afford him his only relief, his act of suicide directly results
from the industrial injury, and unless it appears that the
employee could have resisted the impulse to commit suicide,
his death should be compensable. The court also added that
if it could be shown by competent expert testimony that
9. 14 c.c.c. 123 (1948).
10. 14 C.C.c. at 123.
11. 181 Cal. App.2d 816, 5 Cal. Rptr.
786 (1960).
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absent the injury there would have been no suicide, the injury
is the proximate cause of death.
The legislature acted speedily after Burnight to add another
sub-section to section 3600 aimed directly at death by suicide. This sub-section provided that where an employee
wilfully and deliberately caused his own death, it was not
compensable. I3 The legislature's action seemed to be an
attempt to limit or overrule Burnight and to reinstate the
old narrower rule applied by the WCAB for so many years.
Perhaps because most attorneys believed this was the legislative intent, the new provision did not come before the
courts for construction until 1968.
In 1968, in the case of Beauchamp v. WCAB,14 the court
considered for the first time the compatibility of section 3600
with the Burnight decision. In Beauchamp the WCAB denied
death benefits for suicide apparently believing that the addition
of the new section again reinstated the old rule, precluding
compensability where the deceased knew what he was doing.
Not so, said the district court, holding that the legislative
amendment was entirely consistent with Burnight and that
the rule stated therein must be followed.
As the supreme court denied hearing in Beauchamp, it
appears that where it can be shown by competent evidence
that but for the industrial injury there would have been no
suicide, the suicide is compensable.
Injury in Altercation with Employer

In Litzmann v. WCAB/ 5 the court of appeal appears to
have attempted judicial repeal of the sub-section of Labor
Code section 3600, which provides that as a condition to the
right to compensation benefits the injury must not arise out
of an altercation in which the injured employee is the initial
physical aggressor. I6 The court, while specifically stating that
it was not considering the constitutional question, seemed to
be declaring the provision, section 3600 (g), invalid on the
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14. 259 Cal. App.2d 147, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 352 (1968).
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ground that it is unconstitutional. The Litzmann court also
substitutes its judgment of the inference to be drawn from
the evidence for the inference drawn by the referee, and does
so without so much as the courtesy of a nod to sections 5952
and 5953 of the Code. 17
In Litzmann a truck driver, waiting in a dispatch room with
other truck drivers, went to a coffee urn to draw some hot
water. He was apparently bumped by another truck driver
and turned and threw the cup of hot water at the other man.
The other driver became irate and picked up a coffee pot
and emptied its contents on Litzmann. Litzmann was burned
and applied for workmen's compensation benefits. The referee found that he was injured in the course and scope of his
employment, but that his injury arose out of an altercation
in which he was the initial aggressor and that benefits must
therefore be denied under section 3600(g). Litzmann's petition for reconsideration was denied and the court granted his
petition for review.
After devoting most if its discussion to a case lS decided
before the enactment of section 3600(g) the court mentioned
that in 1961 the legislature enacted a sub-section which prohibits compensation benefits to the initial physical aggressor
and in a footnote stated that, in view of the earlier case, the
enactment might be unconstitutional but, as the question was
not before it, there was no need for the court to decide its
constitutionality. The court went on to discuss the only case
in which that amendment has been comidered,19 a case which
distinguished "altercation" from "horseplay" by characterizing
"horseplay" as an absence of animosity and "altercation" as
a willingness to inflict, or the actual infliction of, bodily harm.
The Litzmann court then concluded, ". . . We are satisfied
17. Labor Code §§ 5952 and 5953
are reproduced herein under the heading The Change of Judicial A ttitude ill
Appellate Re\'iew of WCAB Decisions,
footnotes 6 and 7.
18. State Compensation Ins. Fund v.
Industrial Accident Comm., 38 Cal.2d
659, 242 P.2d 311 (1952). In this case,
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19. Tate v. Industrial Accident
Comm., 120 Cal. App.2d 657, 261 P.2d
759 (1953).
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that the evidence does not sustain the finding that the applicant
was the aggressor, and that, even if it did, compensation could
not be denied on that ground."20 (Emphasis added.)
The court supported its re-evaluation of the facts with the
statement:
There is no evidence here that there was any willingness
or intent to inflict bodily harm on Dean, or that he [Litzmann] actually did inflict any bodily harm on him. It
also seems clear that applicant's act was characterizied
by an absence of animosity.1
What made it clear to the court that the act of throwing
hot water, freshly drawn from a coffee urn, at another man
was characterized by an "absence of animosity" was left unstated and, absent clairvoyance, would appear to require the
drawing of an inference from the evidence.
In another district of the court of appeal, the claimant in
Ochsner v. WCAB 2 attempted to raise the issue of unconstitutionality of section 3600 (g) . Review of the constitutional
question was denied by the court of appeal and by the supreme
court. At the time of this writing, it is not known if the
supreme court will grant a hearing in Litzmann. If a hearing
is not granted, there is a strong possibility that section 3600
(g) may be deemed unconstitutional in some judicial districts
and constitutional in others.
Insurance Coverage

In a case of first impression, Pacific Indemnity Co. v.
WCAB,3 the district court decided that an employer's workmen's compensation insurance policy provides insurance coverage for the employer's intentional assault upon an employee,
but that the employee is confined to his workmen's compensation benefits and may not sue his employer for civil damages.
In an earlier appeal in the same matter, the court disapproved
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a WCAB decision that the workmen's compensation law does
not cover injuries caused by an assault by the employer, and
the court granted the injured employee the right to proceed
before the WCAB (then the Industrial Accident Commission)
for workmen's compensation benefits.4 Following that earlier
decision, the superior court granted a defense motion for dismissal of the civil damage action which the employee had filed
against her employer. The employee had been granted compensation benefits and the WCAB had held that the employer's
workmen's compensation carrier was liable for those benefits.
The compensation carrier appealed the WCAB decision holding it liable under the compensation policy, and the employee
appealed dismissal of her civil action; the appeals were consolidated.
While not questioning the employee's substantive right to
compensation benefits, the carrier disclaimed insurance coverage on the theory that statutory declarations of public policy
apart from the compensation law preclude insurance covering
wilful injury by a policy holder. Specifically, the carrier
relied on Insurance Code section 533, which states in part,
"An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act
of the insured," and on Civil Code section 1668, which states
in part, "All contracts which have for their objective, directly
or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his
own . . . wilful injury to the person or property of another
are against the policy of the law."
In considering these contentions, the court pointed out that
Insurance Code section 11661 specifically prohibits an employer's insuring against the penalty for serious and wilful
misconduct and that Labor Code sections 3700 and 3710.2
make it mandatory upon the employer to "secure the payment of compensation" either by liability insurance or by a
certificate of consent to self insure. The court stated that if
Insurance Code section 533 and Civil Code section 1668 were
to apply to workmen's compensation liability, this would de4. Azevedo v. Industrial Accident
Comm., 243 Cal. App.2d 370, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 283 (I966).
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Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

127

29

Workmen's Compensation
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 7

prive Insurance Code section 11661 of a useful function. The
latter section is a specialized expression of public policy expressed by the other two statutes, "but evolved for the particular purpose of workmen's compensation coverage."5
Therefore, in the workmen's compensation system, Insurance Code section 11661, prohibiting an employer's insuring
himself against his liability for the penalty for serious and
wilful misconduct, serves as a sole spokesman of public policy.
Section 533 of the Insurance Code and section 1668 of the
Civil Code are not applicable to compensation insurance
coverage and do not prohibit insurance against the employer's
ordinary liability for disability compensation and medical expense even when such liability is caused by the employer's
wilful wrong.
The court pointed out that most of the decisions concerning
an employee's right to proceed against his employer in the
superior court or before the WCAB have been decisions on
procedural matters, not on substantive rights. The court
found that Labor Code sections 3600 and 3601 are substantive
declarations confining an employee's claim to workmen's compensation benefits and precluding an employee from the right
to civil damages.
On September 15, 1967, the Insurance Commissioner issued
Ruling No. 157 which deleted Rule IV, paragraph 5 of the
Manual of Rules, Classifications and Basic Rates for Workmen's Compensation Insurance. This rule had been in effect
for many years, permitting workmen's compensation insurance
carriers to exclude corporate executive officers from workmen's compensation coverage by special endorsement. The
effect of this ruling is that workmen's compensation policies
with an effective date on or after April 1, 1968 may no longer
exclude corporate executive officers from workmen's compensation coverage.
Right to Control Medical Treatment
In Zeeb v. WCAB,6 the supreme court changed what was
5. Pacific Indemnity v. WCAB, 264
Cal. App.2d at -,70 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
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generally considered well-established law for the past 40 years.
Prior to 1928, the Industrial Accident Commission had
adopted a policy that once an employer or carrier lost control
of the medical treatment to be provided for an industrial
injury, it could not be regained without consent of the employee. 7 In 1928, the court of appeal handed down a decision
which the then Industrial Accident Commission (and most
authorities) felt required adoption of a policy that "lost
medical control" could be regained by adequate tender. 8
In Zeeb, the employee had received treatment from a doctor
selected by the carrier apparently until his condition became
quiescent. Several months later, when his condition again
required treatment, the doctor chosen by the carrier refused
to render further treatment on the ground that the employee's
condition at that time was not due to the industrial injury.
The employee went to a doctor of his choice and later sought,
and was granted, reimbursement by the WCAB for selfprocured medical treatment. Later the carrier notified the
employee that it was authorizing further treatment by the
doctor it had originally selected, and would not authorize
further treatment by the doctor chosen by the employee. The
employee refused to accept the services of the carrier's doctor
and petitioned the WCAB for a determination that he was
entitled to continue treatment with the doctor he had selected,
at the expense of the carrier. The WCAB denied the employee's claim and he appealed. The supreme court stated
that, because of the ".
. vacillating position of the Commission, there does not appear to be any basis in this case
for the application of the principle that long-standing administrative interpretation of a statute is entitled to great weight."9
The court, finding that the 1928 case on which the Industrial
7. See 2 Hanna, California Law of
Employee Injuries and Workmen's Compensation (1967) pages 16-35, note 55.
8. 2 Hanna, California Law of Employee Injuries and Workmen's CompensaliOi/ (1967) pages 16-35, Section 16.04(2)(d) and note 55 therein.
9. The court did not specify in what

9
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and its predecessor, the Industrial Accident Commission have both maintained
the same interpretation of section 4600,
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Accident Commission had based its change of interpretation
of section 4600 had been interpreted too broadly, held that
where the employer or carrier has refused medical treatment
necessitating an employee to procure his own treatment, the
treatment should continue with the doctor chosen by the
employee, in the absence of a change of condition or evidence
that the treatment given by the employee's doctor is defective,
or unless additional treatment is necessary.
The Zeeb case has not only changed a long-standing and
well-established rule on workmen's compensation law, but
has also sown the seeds for much litigation. What change
of condition is necessary to permit the employer or carrier
to regain control? What treatment is "defective"? How long
must the employer or carrier continue paying for treatment
by a doctor of the injured employee's choice when the employee's condition doesn't improve? When "additional treatment
is necessary," must the employer continue to provide the
employee with treatment by the doctor of his choice, as well
as obtaining additional specialists of the employer-carrier's
choice? What is "additional treatment"? These questions
will provide some interesting cases.
Payment and Amount of Benefits
In Grillo v. Commercial Union Insurance Co. 10 the WCAB,
in an en banc decision, laid down rules for the type of instrument that must be used in paying workmen's compensation
benefits. The carrier in Grillo used a draft on an out-of-state
bank to satisfy its liability for benefits awarded an injured
employee. Local banks to which the employee took the
draft would not cash it, but accepted it for collection at the
cost of $1.00. Collection took 11 days. The employee filed
a petition requesting a penalty for the carrier's delay in payment as well as for its failure to pay interest. The referee
found that the payment of compensation had been unreasonably delayed and penalized the carrier for failing to comply
with the provisions of section 4651, which requires that payment of disability benefits shall not be made by a written instru10. 33 C.C.C. 438 (1968).
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ment ". . . unless it is negotiable and payable in cash, on
demand, without discount, at some established place of business in the state." The referee also found that the carrier
had not complied with section 5800, which requires the payment of interest on all due and unpaid payments from the date
of making and filing of awards. The WCAB granted reconsideration on its own motion and upheld the referee's decision.
The WCAB noted that it was aware of section 212, which
covers the type of instrument required to be used by employers in payment of employees' wages, and which requires that
such an instrument must be "negotiable and payable in cash,
on demand, without discount, at some established place of
business in the State, the name and address of which must
." While recognizing that
appear on the instrument.
section 4651 does not specifically require that an instrument
used in payment of workmen's compensation benefits show
on its face the name and address of some established place
of business in the state in which it could be cashed, the board
thought that the requirement of section 4651, that instruments
used to pay workmen's compensation benefits be payable at
some established place in the state, would be rendered meaningless unless such place was plainly shown on the face of the
instrument.
The board also noted that while the receipt of a properly
drawn instrument in payment of compensation would toll the
running of interest, the instrument used in the case before it
was not properly drawn, and therefore interest should be
awarded.
For the first time since 1959, the legislature increased the
amount of some compensation benefits. Sections 4453 and
4460 were amended by AB 1, effective January 1, 1969, to
increase the maximum average weekly earnings to be used in
computing temporary disability from $107.69 to $134.62.
The effect of this amendment is to increase maximum temporary disability from $70.00 per week to $87.50 per week.
The statutory amendments have no effect on the minimum
temporary disability rate nor on the permanent disability rate.
Section 4702 was amended to increase the death benefits
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
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of a surviving widow from $17,500 to $20,000 and to increase
the death benefit of a surviving widow with one or more
dependent minor children from $20,500 to $23,000. No
increase was made in the maximum amount payable to partial
dependents.
Section 4701 (a) was amended to increase the maximum
allowable for burial expense from $600 to $1,000.
Subrogation

Harrison v. Englebrick ll laid to rest the troublesome problem of the applicable statute of limitations for intervention in
. negligence suits against third parties. This problem had not
existed until 1964 when the court in Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Fabian 12 mentioned, by way of dicta, that the employer
had only one year to file a lien or to intervene. It was generally
thought that the court's dicta would not cause a serious problem because of section 3853's clear statement providing for
the employee's or the employer's right to intervene in the
other's suit. "If the action is brought by either the employer
or the employee, the other may, at any time before trial on
the facts, join as a party plaintiff or shall consolidate his action,
if brought independently." (Emphasis added.) Section 3856
(b), on which the employer's right to a lien against a recovery
by an employee is based, does not specifically indicate the
time an application for a lien against a judgment must be filed,
but similar language in earlier forms of that section has been
held to grant the employer the right to file the lien at any
time before satisfaction of judgment. 13
In Harrison, the injured employee filed a timely suit for
damages against a third party on April 3, 1962, and the
employer's workmen's compensation carrier intervened on
October 13, 1964. The defendants in the civil suit demurred
to the complaint in intervention on the ground that the cause
of action therein contained was barred by the statute of limi-
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tations. The superior court sustained the demurrer of the
defendants without leave to amend and entered a judgment
dismissing the employer's complaint in intervention. The
employer appealed and the court of appeal discussed old
cases permitting the employee to intervene in an employer's
suit well after the one-year period had run and decided the
employer should have the same right. Nowhere in its decision does the court refer to the plain language of section
3853 which grants either the employer or the employee the
right to intervene in the other's suit "at any time before trial
on the facts."
The WCAB, sitting en bane, decided Pearce v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co./ 4 concerning an employer's right to
credit against future compensation liability for an employee's
third-party recovery. The full impact of Pearce has not yet
been felt. In the Pearce case, heirs of an employee killed
in the course of his employment filed suit against a third
party. That suit was settled. After settlement of the thirdparty suit, the workmen's compensation carrier ceased payment of the workmen's compensation death benefits awarded
certain of the heirs on the theory that its credit for the thirdparty recovery offset its liability. The heirs petitioned the
WCAB to enforce payment under the award alleging, among
other contentions, that the employer's negligence contributed
to the employee's fatal injury and that credit for third-party
recovery should be denied. The issue of whether the WCAB
has jurisdiction to find negligence on the part of the employer,
and to disallow credit based on such finding, was submitted
to the trial referee by brief without a hearing respecting the
employer's negligence. The referee issued a supplemental
award finding that, if the employer's negligence was a proximate cause of the employee's fatal injury, the carrier would
be barred from claiming credit for the third-party recovery.
The referee further decided that the WCAB had jurisdiction
to decide the issue of credit and that the decision of that issue
necessarily included a decision of whether the employer was
concurrently negligent. Reconsideration was granted. Some
14. 33 C.C.C. 243 (1968).
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of the statements made by the board in its discussion of its
reasoning are as significant as the actual holding of the case.
That portion of the holding in which we are here concerned is:
Accordingly we hold that absent an express waiver of
credit, the carrier's right to credit under Labor Code Section 3862 in the amount of the employee's net recovery
from the settlement of a third-party suit is absolute and
unaffected by the employer's alleged negligence. l5
The board's holding may not be startling, but its discussion
and reasoning contain several interesting comments. In discussing section 3861, the section that provides for an employer's right to credit, the board states: "On its face the section
does not condition the employer's right to credit upon his
being free from negligence or fault contributing to the employee's injuries,"l6 and at another place in the decision:
. . . [I]t may be true that when faced with a Superior
Court finding of an employer's negligence, and a specific
indication of the extent of the reduction of the thirdparty's judgment, this Board has the power and the duty
to adjust the employer's or carrier's credit accordingly.l7
(Emphasis added.)
It seems that the board is not all convinced that it must
deny credit to an employer or carrier where there has been a
superior court finding of the employer's contributory negligence, and it would also appear that the board is at least considering that section 3861 may give the employer or carrier
an absolute right to credit against future liability for workmen's compensation even though the employer's lien for benefits already paid may have been denied in the superior court
on the ground that the employer was contributorily negligent.
15. 33 C.C.C. at 249. (The reference
to section 3862 must be a typographical
error as that section has nothing to do
with credit rights. Section 3861, previously referred to in the opinion, provides for an employer's right to credit,
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The board makes another intriguing observation:
An employer's obligation to furnish medical treatment
may require different considerations respecting a claim of
credit for a third-party recovery . . . Without deciding
the issue, it should be noted that the employer's obligation
to provide medical treatment under Labor Code section
4600 may not be relieved by applicant's net third-party's
recovery, since under the subrogation statutes such a
recovery may relieve only the obligation to pay indemnity.Is
To date, where credit has been granted, it has been granted
against all future liability including the liability to furnish
medical treatment.
Very probably, the board's speculations will soon bring
before it the question of whether a superior court's finding
of employer contributory negligence bars credit in the amount
of the employee's net third-party recovery against future compensation liability and also whether credit, when granted,
includes the liability for further medical treatment.
The board also decided in Pearce that it did not have
jurisdiction to determine whether or not the employer was
contributorily negligent in causing the employee's injury.
The old adage "last but not least" applies to the final case
to be discussed in this article. In LaBorde v. McKesson &
Robbins I9 a compensation carrier who had intervened in an
injured employee's third-party action was appealing from the
trial court's denial of its lien against the settlement reached
between the plaintiff-employee and the defendant-third party,
which purported to cover only the plaintiff's general damages
and to leave the defendant's liability for special damages open.
The defendant had raised the issue of the employer's contributory negligence in its answer and, after more than two
days of trial, the attorneys for the plaintiff-employee and
third-party defendant informed the court that they had reached
an agreement to settle the plaintiff's claim for general dam18. 33 C.C.c. at 248.
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ages but had given no consideration to the compensation
carrier's expenditures. The carrier refused to consent to the
settlement on that basis but made various motions aimed
at recov~ ring its expenditures from the settlement of the plaintiff's "geaeral damages." The trial court denied the motions
and directed the carrier to proceed to trial on the sole remaining issue, the employer's concurrent negligence. The carrier
refused, moved instead for dismissal of its complaint in intervention, and made further motions in attempting to impose
a lien on defendant's recovery, seeking an order allocating
expenses and fees, attempting to force production of the settlement agreement, restraining the defendant from transferring
funds to the plaintiff, and restraining the plaintiff from dissipating funds. Appeal followed denial of the carrier's motions.
The court of appeal was faced with three problems in supporting the trial court's actions: Section 3859, section 3860,
and the case of Smith v. Trapp.2o
The year before the LaBorde decision, another court of
appeal, in Smith v. Trapp, facing a very similar set of facts,
held that a plaintiff and defendant in a third-party suit may
not compromise absent the. employer's consent, though the
compromise purports to preserve the employer's or carrier's
rights against the defendant. The court in LaBorde handled
the Smith case by in part distinguishing it and in part disagreeing with it. The LaBorde court distinguished the Smith
case by pointing out that there was substantial evidence of
concurrent negligence on the part of the employer during
the more than two days of trial on LaBorde where there had
been no presentation of evidence in the Smith case. The
LaBorde court further distinguished Smith by pointing out that
Smith was a wrongful death action in which damages would
generally be gauged by dependency as were the compensation
benefits in that case, so that the settlement portions to which
the plaintiffs and intervening employer were entitled were
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interwoven and overlapping. The LaBorde court also said
that there were statements in the Smith decision with which
it could not agree (without specifying them) and, in any
event, it was not bound by Smith.
The court was also faced with sections 3859 and 3860
of the Labor Code which are quite specific in their terms.
Section 3859 states in part, ". . . No release or settlement
of any claim under this chapter as to either the employee
or the employer is valid without the written consent of both."
Section 3860(a) states in part, that no "settlement .
with or without suit, is valid or binding as to any party
thereto without notice to . . . the employer . . . with
opportunity to the employer to recover the amount of compensation he has paid." Section 3860(b) stales in part, "The
entire amount of such settlement, with or without suit, is
subject to the employer's full claim for reimbursement. . . ."
The LaBorde court admits that sections 3859 and 3860
would justify the conclusion that a settlement by an employee
without the consent of the employer or without reimbursing
the employer in full could not be made. However, the court
points out that those sections were enacted before decision
in Witt v. Jackson l and holds that those sections were not
designed to cover the Witt v. Jackson situation. The court
states that those sections
[W]ere not intended to block a settlement between an injured employee and a third party tortfeasor
where the concurrent negligence of the employer has
been made an issue in the litigation and where the settlement is carefully drawn to leave intact all the rights
of the employer (and his compensation carrier). 2
The propriety of plaintiff and defendant settling without
the employer's consent under sections 3859 and 3860 came
under consideration by Judge Gerald S. Levin of the Superior
Court of the City and County of San Francisco when he
granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting such a settlement
1. 57 Cal.2d 57, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369,
366 P.2d 641 (1961).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

2. 264 Cal. App.2d at - , 70 Cal.
Rptr. at 728.
CAL LAW 1969
137

39

Workmen's Compensation
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 7

in May of 1965. 3 Judge Levin's reasoning and conclusions
were surprisingly similar to those of the court in Smith. Both
the Smith court and Judge Levin were presented with the
arguments that Witt v. Jackson made the provisions of sections
3859 and 3860 inapplicable and both rejected those arguments. The court in Smith and Judge Levin were both presented with the argument that permitting a settlement leaving
the intervening carrier's right to proceed with the case open
in no way prejudiced the employer or carrier. Both rejected
this argument, pointing out that an intervenor's status in the
preparation and trial of a case is one of subordination to
and in recognition of the propriety of the plaintiff's case and
that the plaintiff must be permitted to dominate and control
such a suit to its conclusion, unfettered by the views of the
intervenors. The court in Smith recognized as well the possibility of collusion between the parties to the settlement when
judicial sanction is afforded compromises without the consent
of the employer.
The courts that have considered the question of the effect
of Witt v. Jackson on sections 3859 and 3860 have presented
us with a mixed bag of views. The only certainty as to the
question of whether a plaintiff-employee and third-party
defendant can settle their differences without consideration of
the intervening employer's lien is that it is uncertain, as are
many other areas of workmen's compensation law at the
present time.
3. Titus v. Haas & Haynie (No.
523156). Reported in the June 3rd and
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